value-maximizing size of the firm, is not surprising. The second, more subtle and difficult to measure, is the profit potential from exercising more effective control, to which we ascribe the name control potential. The third is systematic regulation, the general purpose of which is to impose, in one form or another, constraints on the scope and impact of shareholder decisions. In addition to these, we consider the amenity potential of firms, about which more will be said below.
Value-maximizing Size
The size of firms that compete successfully in product and input markets varies within and among industries. The larger is the competitively viable size, ceteris paribus, the larger is the firm's capital resources and, generally, the greater is the market value of a given fraction of ownership. The higher price of a given fraction of the firm should, in itself, reduce the degree to which ownership is concentrated. Moreover, a given degree of control generally requires a smaller share of the firm the larger is the firm. Both these effects of size imply greater diffuseness of ownership the larger is a firm. This may be termed the risk-neutral effect of size on ownership. Risk aversion should reinforce the risk-neutral effect. An attempt to preserve effective and concentrated ownership in the face of larger capital needs requires a small group of owners to commit more wealth to a single enterprise. Normal risk aversion implies that they will purchase additional shares only at lower, risk-compensating prices. This increased cost of capital discourages owners of larger firms from attempting to maintain highly concentrated ownership.
As the value-maximizing size of the firm grows, both the riskneutral and risk-aversion effects of larger size ultimately should weigh more heavily than the shirking cost that may be expected to accompany a more diffuse ownership structure, so that an inverse relationship between firm size and concentration of ownership is to be expected. Larger firms realize a lower overall cost with a more diffuse ownership structure than do small firms. The choice by owners of a diffuse ownership structure, therefore, is consistent with stockholder wealth-(or utility-) maximizing behavior.
Control Potential
Control potential is the wealth gain achievable through more effective monitoring of managerial performance by a firm's owners. If the market for corporate control and the managerial labor market perfectly aligned the interests of managers and shareholders, then control potential would play no role in explaining corporate ownership STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 1 159 structure (although it might then explain the degree to which ownership by professional management is concentrated). We assume, however, that neither of these markets operates costlessly. In addition to the transaction and information costs associated with the acquisition and maintenance of corporate control, Jarrell and Bradley (1980) have shown that there are significant regulatory costs associated with control transactions. These nontrivial costs act effectively as a tax on corporate control transactions. Although we are unaware of similar empirical studies of transaction costs associated with the managerial labor market, we assume that this market also imperfectly disciplines corporate managers who work contrary to the wishes of shareholders. Our view is that these transaction costs impose a specific identity and control potential on firms. Alterations in the structure of corporate ownership, in part, can be understood as a response to these costs.
We seek to uncover elements of a firm's environment that are pervasive and persistent in their effect on control potential. Firm-specific uncertainty is one such factor. Firms that transact in markets characterized by stable prices, stable technology, stable market shares, and so forth are firms in which managerial performance can be monitored at relatively low cost. In less predictable environments, however, managerial behavior simultaneously figures more prominently in a firm's fortunes and becomes more difficult to monitor. Frequent changes in relative prices, technology, and market shares require timely managerial decisions concerning redeployment of corporate assets and personnel. Disentangling the effects of managerial behavior on firm performance from the corresponding effects of these other, largely exogenous factors is costly, however.2 Accordingly, we believe that a firm's control potential is directly associated with the noisiness of the environment in which it operates. The noisier a firm's environment, the greater the payoff to owners in maintaining tighter control. Hence, noisier environments should give rise to more concentrated ownership structures.3
Clearly, we take the view that owners believe they can influence the success of their firms and that all outcomes are neither completely random nor completely foreseeable. This belief constitutes an assertion of the existence of risks, opportunities, and managerial shirking that are in some degree controllable by owners for the profit of own-2 The effect of imperfect information on monitoring costs is developed formally in Holmstrom (1979 Holmstrom ( , 1982 . 3 An interesting variant of the hypothesis that corporate ownership structure is, in part, dependent on the stability of a firm's environment is found in Smith (1937, pp. 713-14): "The only trades which it seems possible for ajoint stock company to carry on successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those, of which all the operations are capable of being reduced to what is called a routine, or to such a uniformity of method as admits of little or no variation." ers. The profit potential from exercising a given degree of owner control is, we believe, correlated with instability in the firm's environment. This instability may be measured in many ways, by fluctuations in product and input prices of relevance to a firm, for example, or by variations in a firm's market share. We rely on instability of a firm's profit rate, measured by variation in both stock returns and accounting returns. Profit data are readily available, and profit variability offers a global measure of the impact of the various subcomponents of instability in its environment; profit also is the "bottom line" that so interests stockholders.
The three measures of instability examined here are (1) firmspecific risk (SE), as measured by the standard error of estimate calculated from fitting the "market model," (2) the standard deviation of monthly stock market rates of return (STD,), and (3) the standard deviation of annual accounting profit rates (STDa). Our intuition favors firm-specific risk as the factor most strongly associated with the type of instability for which control is most useful. The exercise of control should be particularly important to those operations of a firm that can be influenced and responded to most easily. These would seem to include the inner functioning of the firm and its operations in the markets in which it purchases and sells. These are proximate and specific to the firm. In contrast to these sources of instability, economywide events such as the rate of growth of money supply or fluctuations in government tax-expenditure flows are beyond a firm's control and, at best, can be reacted to intelligently. Because of these reactive possibilities, even this more distant and less firm-specific instability is likely to call forth more concentrated ownership, but greater control potential is offered by instability that is more specific to the firm.
We include instability in accounting rates of return among our measures, though we recognize many defects of accounting data. One of these defects is purely statistical: whereas we have collected monthly stock return data, our accounting data are annual data. For any time period, then, there are 12 times as many observations with which to calculate a stock return variance as there are for calculating an accounting return variance. Accounting profits, however, may reflect year-to-year fluctuations in underlying business conditions better than stock market rates of return, since stock market rates of return reflect expected future developments that may cloak contemporary fluctuations in business conditions. We say "may" because today's accounting rate of return is influenced by past investment expenditures (and other carryover accounting entries), and this also attenuates the impact of "today's" instabilities. It is not clear on a priori grounds which measure is better suited to measure day-to-day or year-to-year variability in the firm's environment.
Regulation
Systematic regulation restricts the options available to owners, thus reducing control potential in ways that may not be reflected fully in profit instability. Regulation also provides some subsidized monitoring and disciplining of the management of regulated firms. A bank whose balance sheet looks too risky to regulators will find itself under considerable pressure to replace its management. These "primary" effects of regulation should reduce ownership concentration to a greater degree than would be predicted simply on the basis of profit instability.
We expect the net impact of regulation to be dominated by these primary effects, which call for greater diffuseness of ownership in regulated industries. There are also well-known problems of amenity consumption by management in a regulated setting. These should be more important than in nonregulated firms because cost-plus pricesetting regulation reduces the incentive to hold down cost while it dulls competition. Greater control of management by owners would seem to be called for and, hence, greater concentration of ownership. However, owner incentives to reduce managerial amenity consumption are also dulled by the tendency of commissions to adjust prices toward levels that leave the profit rate unchanged, and this counteracts the desire for greater control of management.
Amenity Potential of a Firm's Output
Those who own large fractions of the outstanding shares of a firm either manage the firm themselves or are positioned to see to it that management serves their interests. Maximizing the value of the firm generally serves these interests well, for this provides the largest possible budget for a shareholder to spend as a "household." The advantage of maximizing profit through the firm and then consuming in the household is based on the implicit assumption that specialization in consumption is productive of maximum utility. However, when owners can obtain their consumption goals better through the firm's business than through household expenditures, they will strive to control that firm more closely to obtain these goals. Just as the potential for higher profit creates a demand for closer monitoring of management by owners, so does the potential for firm-specific amenity consumption.
We refer here to the utility consequences of being able to influence the type of goods produced by the firm, not to the utility derived from providing general leadership to the firm. We believe that there is nonpecuniary income associated with the provision of general leadership and with the ability to deploy resources to suit one's personal preferences, but we are not now prepared to assert how this varies across firms or different ownership structures.4 However, we do believe that two industries are likely to call forth tight control in order to indulge such personal preferences. These are professional sports clubs and mass media firms. Winning the World Series or believing that one is systematically influencing public opinion plausibly provides utility to some owners even if profit is reduced from levels otherwise achievable. These consumption goals arise from the particular tastes of owners, so their achievement requires owners to be in a position to influence managerial decisions. Hence, ownership should be more concentrated in firms for which this type of amenity potential is greater. Unfortunately, other than a shared perception that the sports and media industries are especially laden with amenity potential for owners, we have no systematic way of tracking amenity potential. On balance, we consider amenity potential a more speculative explanation of ownership concentration in these special industries than are size, control potential, and regulation. The CDE used various SEC forms to secure data, including forms 3, 4, 13f, 14d-1, and 144, and, in addition, it examined corporate proxy statements, secondary offering and merger prospectuses, public pension plan portfolios, employee stock ownership plan reports, and foundation and educational endowment portfolios. Where institutional investors held shares in a management capacity (e.g., investment advisory agreements or trust agreements), the party for whom they managed the shares is identified as the holder with investment power. Similarly, when nominees held stock, the party for whom they held the stock is identified as the holder with investment power. Holdings by diversified financial holding companies, investment banks, brokerage firms, and investment company managers are listed in the "street name" of the firms when the firms are not holding the shares in a management capacity.
Data and Measurements

This study uses ownership data obtained from three directories published by Corporate Data Exchange (CDE): CDE
Our statistical work relies heavily on the percentage of shares owned by the most important shareholders, A5 and A20, and the approximation of the Herfindahl index, AH. Different notation is introduced when we discuss institutional and noninstitutional shareholders.
In our regression equations we measure the percentage of shares owned by the top five and top 20 shareholders by applying a logistic transformation to these percentages, using the formula log percentage concentration g 100 -percentage concentration The transformation is made to convert an otherwise bounded dependent variable into an unbounded one. A logarithmic transformation is applied to the Herfindahl measure of ownership concentration.5 We designate the transformed variable by prefixing L, as in LA5, LA20, and LAH.
A glance at a simple correlation matrix for A5, A20, and AH indicates that we can expect similar empirical results from using these alternative measures. The correlation between A20 and AH is weakest, but it is still .71. For purposes of constructing an index of ownership concentration, the 20 largest ownership interests establish a workable outer limit. Beyond 20, it is difficult to interpret the measure as a meaningful index of ownership concentration. Our measure of firm size (EQUITY) is the average annual market value of the firm's common equity during the period 1976-80, with units in thousands of dollars. We have experimented with other size measures (e.g., book value of assets), but the general nature of the statistical result is unaffected by this choice. Since our ownership data pertain to the ownership of common equity, we prefer to proxy size with a measure of the value of common equity. The second part of our empirical work tests the Berle-Means thesis, which implies that diffuse ownership structures adversely affect corporate performance. We test this by assessing the impact of ownership structure on accounting profit rate (RETURNa). In doing so, it is necessary to control for other factors that may affect accounting profit rate. These other factors include the size of the firm as measured by the book value of assets averaged over 1976-80 (ASSET) and a set of variables that seek to standardize for accounting artifacts. These variables are ratios to sales of capital expenditures (CAP), advertising (ADV), and R & D expenses (RD), all measured as averages from the 1976-80 time period. Table 2 gives summary definitions of all variables used in this paper. Summary statistics for these variables for the 511 firms in our sample are shown in table 3.
Statistical Analysis of Ownership Concentration
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates of LA5 on three alternative measures of profit instability and four other variables are All other variables take the expected signs, and all of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the .95 level. Size of firm, as measured by the market value of equity, is negatively related to ownership concentration.8 The dummy for systematic regulation indicates that the average concentration of ownership for the regulated firms is significantly less than for other firms. The ownership structure of utility firms is affected more by regulation than is that of financial firms. Media firms exhibit significantly more ownership concentration, on average, than other firms, a finding that is consistent with the notion that tighter control is required to achieve the amenity potential offered by the unique output of these firms.
The variation in LA5 explained by these equations is at least 30 percent. When firm-specific risk is the instability measure, 33 percent of the variation is explained. The coefficients of all other variables 7 Two additional specifications of the ownership equation deserve comment. As an alternative proxy for control potential, we included the intraindustry variability (using four-digit SIC codes) in average accounting profit rates (1976-80) as an independent variable. Plausibly, greater differences in profit rates among firms in the same industry provide an index of the difference in performance that can be wrought by superior control decisions. However, no significant relationship exists between this new index of control potential and ownership concentration. When it is entered as the sole control potential variable, the intraindustry variability of profit rate enters with a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient, and it does not significantly affect the other regression coefficients. When this variable is added to the regression equations in which SE proxies for control potential, it enters with a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient, and it again leaves all other coefficient estimates essentially unaffected. The simple correlation of the intraindustry variability of profit rate with SE, STDS, and STDa never exceeds .10. High values of the intraindustry variability of profit rate may correlate with poor census definitions of industries, or they may reflect accounting artifacts that increase the divergence between profit rates within industries, but there is no positive evidence of a linkage to control potential. This absence receives confirmation from a statistical study that regresses ownership concentration on equity, SE, SE2, and 41 dummy variables, one for each two-digit industry containing our sample firms. The coefficients of only four industries exhibited statistical significance, and these were either mass media or regulated industries. Industry characteristics other than these bear no relationship to ownership concentration. This absence of significance is puzzling to us, but its implication may be important to industrial organization studies. What the data seem to be saying is that firms are significantly different, even within traditional industry classifications, and that many individual firms may constitute quasi industries in and of themselves in regard to ownership concentration. 8 We also estimated a regression equation in which we entered the logarithm of EQUITY as an independent variable. This variable entered with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, and its inclusion did not significantly affect the other coefficients. Similarly, we included the squared value of EQUITY in addition to EQUITY and the other independent variables. EQUITY continued to enter with a significant, negative coefficient, and its squared value entered with a positive but insignificant coefficient. The other coefficient estimates remained unaffected in this equation. In table 6 we measure ownership concentration separately for all investors (A5), family and individual investors (F5), and institutional investors (I5). The percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests (not logistically transformed) of each shareholder class is the dependent variable in these regressions.9 We examined these classifications of owners to discover whether the significance of the coefficient on the media variable is attributable to the behavior of family and individual owners or to institutional owners. Since the assumption of amenity potential is strongly governed by personal tastes, we do not expect ownership concentration to be significantly higher for institutional owners if the firm is a media firm. Table 6 reveals that the greater ownership concentration in media firms is attributed almost exclusively to greater family and individual holdings. The coefficient estimate on MEDIA is the identical value, 13.30, and it is statistically significant in the equations in which A5 and F5 are the dependent variables. When I5 is the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate on MEDIA drops to 1.40, and it is not statistically significant. These results are consistent with the interpretation we have given to the amenity potential associated with control of media firms.'0 9 The variables F5 and 15 occasionally take a value of zero, at which point the logistic transformation is undefined. For purposes of estimating these equations, we do not transform the ownership variables. Additional evidence that suggests the amenity potential explanation of ownership structure is found by examining ownership data for professional sports clubs. Although we lack systematic ownership, profit, and size data for individual clubs, we show in table 7 aggregate ownership data for 121 clubs in five major sports. These clubs are much more tightly controlled than the 511 firms in our sample. centration in the sports industry, and they may operate in less stable environments, although we do not know this to be a fact. Nonetheless, these data are consistent with the amenity explanation of ownership structure.
The impact of regulation on ownership concentration is examined from another perspective in table 8. Salomon Brothers rates the regulatory climates in which electric utility firms operate, assigning letter grades based on such factors as the allowed rate of return, the rate base test period used, the cost items allowed in the rate base, and the time taken by commissions to decide rate appeals. The 1979 rating we use is an average of regulatory jurisdictions, calculated by using revenue weighting for utilities operating in more than one jurisdiction. We divide the electric utilities in our sample into two groups: those that operate in regulatory climates that are less "stringent" than the median (i.e., "more favorable" for investment purposes) and all other electric utilities. The dummy variable, REGULATORY CLIMATE, takes the value of one if the utility is in the former group and zero otherwise.
We expect that this index of regulatory climate is positively related to ownership concentration, less stringent regulation offering owners more control potential through fewer restrictions and less commis- Berle and Means's work was anticipated by Thorstein Veblen's (1924) volume, The Engineers and the Price System. Veblen believed that he was witnessing the transfer of control from capitalistic owners to engineer-managers and that the consequences of this transfer were to become more pronounced as diffusely owned corporations grew in economic importance. In the wake of this transfer of power, Veblen saw the end of the type of profit seeking he associated with capitalists, for he believed that capitalistic owners sought neither efficiency nor increased output so much as monopolistic restrictions to raise prices. The engineers, trained and acculturated to seek technological efficiency, would see to it that the production from the firms they now controlled would rise to higher and socially more desirable levels. The profits of monopoly would be sacrificed on the altar of efficiency.
One of Veblen's famous disciples, John Kenneth Galbraith, shared JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY his teacher's assessment of the change in control but evaluated the outcome differently. In The New Industrial State (1967) he argued that the technocrats who had gained control of the diffusely owned modern corporation would sacrifice owner profit to increased output beyond levels that served the real interests of consumers. Enticed to purchase these large output rates by powerful advertising campaigns, consumers would cause the private sector to grow too rapidly and at the expense of the public sector." Although the three views discussed above concerning the consequences of diffuse ownership structures offer somewhat different evaluations, they unanimously imply a positive correlation between ownership concentration and profit rate. If diffuseness in control allows managers to serve their needs rather than tend to the profits of owners, then more concentrated ownership, by establishing a stronger link between managerial behavior and owner interests, ought to yield higher profit rates.
We expect no such relationship. A decision by shareholders to alter the ownership structure of their firm from concentrated to diffuse should be a decision made in awareness of its consequences for loosening control over professional management. The higher cost and reduced profit that would be associated with this loosening in owner control should be offset by lower capital acquisition cost or other profit-enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership if shareholders choose to broaden ownership. Standardizing on other determinants of profit, Demsetz (1983) has argued that ownership concentration and profit rate should be unrelated. Table 9 reports recursive estimates for coefficients of a profit rate equation in which the key independent variables are alternative predicted measures of ownership concentration: LA5, LA20, and LAH. 12 The dependent variable is the mean value of annual accounting profit after taxes, as a percentage of the book value of equity. The mean is calculated for the 5-year period 1976-80. Stock market rates of return presumably adjust for any divergences between the interests " The entire discussion of the separation thesis presumes that diffuseness of ownership is a pervasive phenomenon. Our data cast doubt on this presumption. Our sample is heavily weighted by Fortune 500 firms, precisely the firms that are supposed to suffer from diffuse ownership structures. Yet the mean values of A5 and A20, respectively, are 24.8 percent and 37.7 percent.
12 The predicted measures of LA5, LA20, and LAH were estimated from an OLS equation that included the following independent variables: UTIL, FIN, MEDIA, EQUITY, SE, and SE2. The results reported in table 9 do not change significantly when the ownership equations are estimated using alternative specifications that were previously reported. of professional management and owners, so we rely on accounting rates of return to reveal such divergences. In addition to ownership concentration, we include several other independent variables in this equation. The utilities and financial dummies isolate the impact of systematic regulation. The coefficient on the financial dummy may be explained by accounting procedures, which for these firms include outstanding loans in the asset base. The potential upward bias in asset measurement that results is likely to depress the measured accounting profit rate. Capital, advertising, and R & D expenditures, all as a percentage of sales, standardize for accounting artifacts associated with the decision to expense some of these investments but to depreciate others. The size of the firm is measured by the book value of assets.
The general explanatory power of the profit rate equation is quite low, but regulation does seem to have a negative impact on accounting profit rate. Table 9 shows no significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rate, and especially no JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY significant positive relationship.'3 The data simply lend no support to the Berle-Means thesis.'4 We have suggested above that certain industries may be characterized as offering greater amenity potential and that this would lead to more concentrated ownership. This does not assert that the more concentrated is ownership, the greater the tendency to cater to amenity potential. If we were to make such an assertion it would imply a negative correlation between profit rate and ownership concentration, and this would tend to hide the opposite correlation suggested by Berle and Means. But, then, this would constitute no evidence more favorable to the Berle-Means hypothesis. Catering to amenity potential is maximizing owner utility if not owner profit. Such maximization hardly constitutes evidence of a separation between ownership and control.
Concluding Comments
We have argued, both conceptually and empirically, that the structure of corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximization. Understanding some of the forces that determine corporate ownership structure is valuable in its own right, but we also think that our results are germane to a more general theory of property rights. For example, can the land enclosure movement in England be explained in part by the enhanced control potential of landownership during periods of population growth and rising prices of farm and ranch products? Similarly, does greater predictability of an industry's environment make industry regulation politically more tolerable because collectivization of control is likely to be less damaging in such cases? Our analysis suggests a framework for new studies that may shed some light on these broader questions. 13 Not reported here is a replication of table 9 in which the profit rate equation is estimated using the actual, not predicted, value of the ownership variable. No changes in conclusions are called for by this replication. We also replicated table 9 on a set of firms for which we were able to obtain the industry four-firm concentration ratio. The concentration ratio enters the profit rate equation with a negative and statistically significant sign, but the coefficient estimates on all three ownership variables remain not significant. Earlier studies of the profit-concentration relationship show a weakening of the usual positive correlation during periods of rising price levels. The negative relationship revealed in our work may, therefore, reflect the inflationary tenor of the late 1970s. The estimated ownership equation for this subset of firms performs weaker than it does when estimated for the entire sample.
14 Our results are consistent with those of Stigler and Friedland (1983) . They reject the separation thesis by demonstrating that management salaries are no higher in "management-controlled" than in "owner-controlled" industries.
